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ABSTRACT
A frequently proposed solution to node misbehavior in mo-
bile ad hoc networks is to use reputation systems. But
in ephemeral networks - a new breed of mobile networks
where contact times between nodes are short and neighbors
change frequently - reputations are hard to build. In this
case, local revocation is a faster and more efficient alterna-
tive. In this paper, we define a game-theoretic model to
analyze the various local revocation strategies. We establish
and prove the conditions leading to subgame-perfect equilib-
ria. We also derive the optimal parameters for voting-based
schemes. Then we design a protocol based on our analy-
sis and the practical aspects that cannot be captured in the
model. With realistic simulations on ephemeral networks we
compare the performance and economic costs of the different
techniques.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection (e.g., firewalls); C.2.1 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Architecture and
Design—Wireless communication
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Economics, Security, Theory
Keywords
Ephemeral networks, Game theory, Revocation
1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of mobile ad hoc networks has brought
numerous challenges at every layer of the protocol stack.
Like others, security researchers had to solve a new set of
problems such as self-organized key management [16] and
misbehavior detection [27] in a decentralized, mobile, and
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infrastructureless environment. As ad hoc networks are typ-
ically associated with multihop routing, attacks on the rout-
ing and packet forwarding primitives have received particu-
lar attention [35]. Reputation systems, with their inherent
adaptivity to a constantly changing environment, have been
typically proposed as a good cure to many ad hoc network-
ing ills [11].
Since the early days of ad hoc networks, the research land-
scape has seriously changed. Mostly static sensor networks,
with a single owner and limited network and security in-
frastructure, became a focal topic of research. But packet
forwarding remained an important networking component
and reputation systems proved again to be effective [21].
Now, the landscape is changing again with the advancement
of new types of networks, such as vehicular [34] and delay-
tolerant [19] networks. The common properties of these net-
works are their large scale and the high mobility of wireless
devices. We refer to such networks as ephemeral networks
due to the shortness of the interactions between the partic-
ipating wireless devices. In ephemeral networks, mobility
makes the monitoring of neighbors’ misbehavior infeasible
[12]. In addition, the range of misbehavior types has ex-
tended beyond routing and packet forwarding to more di-
verse problems such as malicious data in vehicular networks
[22]. Because traditional reputation systems are tightly cou-
pled to a specific misbehavior type (as in packet forwarding),
they cannot be merely transposed to these new types of net-
works. This leads us to the conclusion that new primitives
are needed to replace reputation systems, where the latter
cannot be efficient anymore.
In this paper, we advocate a different approach to han-
dling misbehavior. First, the detection system should be
decoupled from the reaction system. Second, the reaction
should be fast and clear-cut to ensure that misbehaving
nodes are denounced to their neighbors and punished de-
spite the changing environment. Where reputation systems
cannot again be the magic pill, another primitive - local re-
vocation - comes to the rescue. In fact, revocation has long
been part of the key management bundle of protocols [16,
17, 24, 36] and was used to cope with node compromise and
misbehavior, sometimes similarly to reputation systems [5].
And although both can achieve the same goal of removing
attackers from a system for certain misbehavior types, sev-
eral differences exist between them.
Reputation systems, on one hand, limit the effect of at-
tackers without specifically removing them. This means that
attackers with bad reputations are naturally excluded from
the network but they can redeem their good reputation by
behaving correctly and benefiting from the short memory
of their neighbors [10]. This also implies that monitoring
nodes have to continuously run a watchdog-like mechanism
[26] and keep state of their neighbors for the duration of
their mutual interactions. This duration is often too short in
ephemeral networks to correctly and timely react to attack-
ers. On the other hand, revocation systems aim to remove
attackers from the system and the only way revoked nodes
can rejoin the system is by using new identities or creden-
tials. Hence, the duration of the interaction and amount of
state corresponding to a given attacker are limited by the
time it takes to make a revocation decision.
It is worth noting that revocation typically refers to the
annulment of credentials, corresponding to a compromised
key, by the key issuer. The key issuer can be a Certificate
Authority (CA) in managed systems [37] or the key owner
herself in self-organized systems [16]. In this work, we con-
sider revocation as a means for nodes to cope with their mis-
behaving neighbors, like in reputation systems. This kind
of local revocation can be particularly useful when the key
issuer is not available to revoke the misbehaving node (e.g.,
when the CA is oﬄine) or when it is unaware of the mis-
behavior, especially when the latter does not involve key
compromise (e.g., sending bogus information). The node
that carries out the local revocation reports its result to the
key issuer once the latter is reachable. A node is completely
denied participation in the network only when the key is-
suer revokes it, based on a decision process that is out of
the scope of this paper. This means that local revocation
is only temporary and can be repudiated, thus preventing
false revocations, due to abusers or errors, from permanently
removing benign nodes from the network.
Several papers propose local revocation mechanisms as de-
fined above. There are three major techniques that emerge:
(i) voting with a fixed number of votes [17, 24, 36] or a fixed
fraction of nodes (e.g., a majority) [5], (ii) key expiration
and update [16], (iii) and suicide [28] whereby an accusing
node can revoke an accused node by invalidating the cre-
dentials of both nodes (the high cost of revocation is meant
to deter the abuse of this mechanism).1 But what is clearly
lacking is a unifying framework for comparing the various
techniques and consequently defining optimum strategies for
given scenarios. For example, the choice of the number of
votes varies significantly among different proposals (it is 5
in [24] and sometimes more than 50 in [5]).
An extensive comparison by simulations of a voting scheme
based on [5] and a suicide scheme based on [28] was car-
ried out in [29] and gave valuable insights into the strengths
and weaknesses of these two techniques in terms of security
and networking performance; in addition, a heuristic hybrid
protocol was proposed but not evaluated. In this paper, we
make the first attempt to define an analytical framework,
based on game theory, that takes into account the economic
considerations of individual nodes (actually their owners, as
explained below) and prove the conditions under which each
strategy (namely, voting or suicide) performs best. Hence,
whereas the study in [29] looks at the optimal conditions for
using each strategy from a network perspective, our work
focuses on the individual preferences of the nodes and then
1A similar strategy of expensive punishment was first intro-
duced as a reputation system for networks of mix cascades
in [18]; in this case, a single node can declare the failure of
its whole mix cascade.
optimizes the network accordingly. In addition, our analyt-
ical framework helped us to design a protocol, RevoGame,
that outperforms the other strategies.
We chose game theory to be our modeling tool because
nodes in ephemeral networks, as defined here, will belong
to individuals and hence should represent the selfish nature
of their owners. As we will further explain in Section 2.1,
the identities of the nodes participating in revocation are
a costly resource and should not be wasted (otherwise, the
node owners may have to pay the logistic costs of renewing
these identities). Thus, although the mechanism of choice
will not be controlled by the device operator (i.e., the user),
it will be implemented using a design policy palatable to
the users. In fact, most users will prefer avoiding the con-
tribution to the system (by revoking attackers) while still
benefiting from its services (removing attackers benefits ev-
eryone), notably due to the potential costs of the revocation
procedure. This situation is famously known as the free rider
problem in game theory [20]. And as game theory is known
to be hard to apply “as is” to networks [25], we complement
our theoretical analysis with a protocol that takes practical
considerations into account and we back up the resulting
design using simulations on an ephemeral network.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce the system model, which we follow up by the game
theoretic model in Section 3 and its analysis in Section 4. In
Section 5 we describe the practical protocol design and show
the corresponding performance in simulations. In Section 6
we conclude the paper.
Other Related Work
The bounds on the number of voters in local majority voting
have been analyzed using graph theory [30]. We do not make
any explicit assumptions on the percentage of attackers. In
fact, our paper tackles the revocation problem from an eco-
nomic perspective, a direction that is gaining momentum in
the security community [4].
Recently, cryptographers started applying game theory to
multi-party computation (e.g., secret sharing). A survey of
the latest results, in addition to a brief tutorial on game
theory, can be found in [23]. A treatment of malicious and
selfish behavior in wireless networks can be found in [13].
2. SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Network Model
We study a network where participating nodes only have
ephemeral (short-lived) connections, e.g., due to high mo-
bility. In this paper we investigate Vehicular Ad hoc NET-
works (VANETs), a typical example of ephemeral networks.
We align our system model with the common assumption in
VANETs that the nodes (i.e., vehicles and base stations) are
computationally powerful, hence they can support public-
key cryptography. In addition, each node contains a tamper-
proof device that digitally signs every communication mes-
sage [3, 31]. We assume that a CA pre-establishes the cre-
dentials for the devices oﬄine (e.g., during the vehicle reg-
istration process), but we do not assume its presence during
the execution of the local revocation protocol.
Privacy is a major concern in future wireless communica-
tion systems. To ensure location privacy for VANETs, both
industry and academia have proposed the use of changing
pseudonyms [3, 31]; pseudonyms can actually be public keys
certified by the CA for determining liabilities in case of ac-
cidents. In line with this widely-accepted proposal, we also
assume that each device changes its pseudonym periodically
to avoid being tracked. Hence, a node identity is only tem-
porary and can be renewed if the node is revoked. But,
given the cost of pseudonym generation (in the logistic and
not computational sense) and management by the CA, each
vehicle has a limited number of pseudonyms that can quickly
become a scarce resource if frequently changed.
We consider a wireless contention-based broadcast medium.
For example, the medium access control protocol for VANETs
will be based on the IEEE 802.11p standard. Vehicles will
periodically broadcast beacon messages (e.g., every 100 or
300 ms over a range of 300 m on highways) containing the
sender’s pseudonym, position, speed, direction, and other
safety-relevant information. The cryptographic overhead of
this stream of messages is heavy but there is ongoing work
to improve its efficiency [14, 15].
2.2 Adversary Model
We assume that the adversaries have the same communi-
cation capabilities as the mobile nodes. Hence, an adversary
possesses the same credentials as any benign node. In this
work, we consider adversaries that disseminate false infor-
mation in the system. For example, in VANETs this false
information can be a warning of the presence of ice on the
road, although there is none; this may cause vehicles to make
a detour to an ice-free road, thus clearing the main road for
an adversary. The adversaries can be misbehaving nodes
themselves or compromised benign nodes (e.g., the sensors
of a vehicle are not protected from tampering and thus are
exposed to attacks). We also assume that adversaries can
collude, for example, by disseminating the same false infor-
mation in order to increase its credibility. Last but not least,
the adversaries can renew their pseudonyms, as any benign
device, at the end of a pre-defined time interval (e.g., dur-
ing the periodic vehicle control) and, if previously revoked,
potentially restart their malicious activity.
2.3 Detection System
We assume that some of the nodes are equipped with
a detection mechanism to identify false information. In
VANETs, vehicles could rely on neighborhood information
to verify whether there is indeed ice on the road [32]. Let
pd be the average probability with which a benign node de-
tects an attacker. One can also interpret pd as the fraction
of nodes that possess the detection capabilities (e.g., luxury
vehicles). In reality, this probability of detection depends
on the nature of the false information and hence is specific
to each attack. The estimation of pd can be done in several
ways. For example, a bit can be set in packets to indicate
the presence of the detection equipment (e.g., a GPS device
to correctly detect attacks related to position). pd can also
be the fraction of nodes observing the same event (this can
be deduced based on their messages) or it can be the amount
of misbehavior. Each node estimates pd independently, but
as explained in Section 5.2, our model applies even in the
presence of only one detector in the system.
3. REVOCATION GAME
In this section, we introduce our game-theoretic model.
The key point of the game-theoretic analysis is to consider
costs when making a revocation decision. In fact, many secu-
rity protocols proposed in the literature are often evaluated
by their capability to cope with or to completely remove
attackers. In addition, the effects of compromise and false
positives corresponding to a security protocol are frequently
taken into account. In this paper, we choose a different met-
ric, namely cost, to design and evaluate a security protocol.
After all, if an attack is mild (e.g., the attacker infrequently
broadcasts false information), there may be no need to re-
voke the attacker, given the effort required to carry out the
revocation. We also take into account the cost of abuse of the
revocation scheme by attackers. In Section 3.1, we describe
the different revocation strategies that nodes can follow. We
introduce the game-theoretic model in Section 3.2 and the
costs in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 is a brief overview of the
game-theoretic concepts that we use in this paper.
3.1 Revocation Strategies
We consider three revocation strategies for each player
(i.e., node) based on the existing protocols. First, player i
can abstain from the local revocation procedure by playing
A. This strategy assumes that player i (the index i indicates
the sequence of play, which is in turn determined by the con-
tention on the wireless channel) is not willing to contribute
to the local revocation procedure and instead expects other
players or eventually the CA to revoke the attacker. Sec-
ond, player i can participate in a local voting procedure by
casting a vote V against a detected attacker [17]. We as-
sume that n votes are required to revoke an attacker locally.
The choice of the value of n is a key issue in voting mech-
anisms and hence we optimize it in Section 4.3. Finally,
following the protocol suggested in [28], we allow player i
to self-sacrifice (denoted by the decision S), i.e., to declare
the invalidity of both its current identity (the pseudonym it
currently uses) and the identity of the attacker. A strate-
gic attacker may optimize the usage of these strategies to
revoke benign nodes, but we leave this attacker model for
future work.
3.2 Game-Theoretic Model
We model the revocation problem using a finite dynamic
(sequential) game G with wireless devices as players. Our
choice of dynamic games [20] is based on the sequential na-
ture of the wireless channel access where the action of one
player is conditioned by the action of the preceding player
(i.e., the second player observes, before making its deci-
sion, the action of the first player). We can represent dy-
namic games by their extensive form, similar to a tree where
branches represent the available actions for a given player.
Each level of the tree represents a stage of the game. We
define a revocation game for each accused node and we as-
sume that if several nodes are accused then there exist as
many revocation games running in parallel. For the sake of
analysis, we consider a single revocation game. Nonetheless,
we take the parallel revocation games into account by calcu-
lating the collusion cost of the attackers playing revocation
games against benign nodes.
There are N benign nodes in one game and M attackers
in total; we describe how N and M are estimated in prac-
tice in Section 5.2. We assume that the number of nodes
with detection capabilities is defined by the probability of
detection pd introduced in Section 2.3, i.e., there are pdN de-
tectors. Hence, we consider these detectors as players. Note
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Figure 1: The extensive form of the revocation game
model when the cost induced by the attack is fixed,
i.e., c. The game is represented by a tree and node 1
plays the first action. The game has three stages cor-
responding to the moves of the three players. The
actions (abstain A, self-sacrifice S, and voting V ) are
represented on each branch of the tree. The leaves
of the tree represent the costs of the game for all
players. v and 1 are the costs of voting and self-
sacrifice, respectively.
that we take the non-detecting nodes also into account when
calculating the social cost introduced in the next section.
As mentioned earlier, we can represent a dynamic revo-
cation game in an extensive-form tree. We show an exam-
ple in Figure 1 for pdN = 3 players that want to revoke
one attacker, all in power range of each other. We assume
that n = 2 votes or a single self-sacrifice are enough to lo-
cally revoke the attacker. Due to the random nature of the
medium access protocol, the sequence of the players’ moves
is not defined in advance; hence, we refer to the players
by their respective order of successful transmission on the
shared channel (i.e., index i).
3.3 Costs
We represent the costs of the players on the leaves of the
extensive-form tree. The cost for any player i has two com-
ponents: the cost induced by the attack and the cost of par-
ticipation in revoking the attacker. All costs are represented
in terms of keys (more precisely, pseudonyms) because they
are a scarce resource, as mentioned in Section 2.1.
As shown in Figure 1, we first assume that the attack-
induced cost is a constant and denote it by c. The value
of this cost depends on the effect of the false information
distributed by the attacker, hence we consider various val-
ues for it in Section 4. Later, we make the more plausible
assumption that the attack-induced cost is variable and ac-
tually increases with time (this is especially true in time-
critical safety applications in VANETs). As for the revo-
cation costs, it is straightforward to assume that abstain-
ing from the game does not cost the players anything. If
player i sacrifices itself, then this action implies a cost of
1 key (the player totally loses its ability to use the sacri-
ficed pseudonym). We assume that casting a vote imposes a
cost v on any player i; for example, each player may have a
voting quota that is decremented each time a player votes.
Although voting costs in terms of computation and com-
munication overhead, we neglect these costs in our model
as we assume that nodes (vehicles in the case of VANETs)
are powerful enough to justify this assumption. In contrast,
the cost of pseudonym management is largely independent
of the computational capabilities of the nodes for which the
pseudonyms are used. We also make the reasonable assump-
tion that v < 1.
For example, in Figure 1, if the three players play (A, V ,
V ), then they successfully revoke the attacker and the second
and third players bear the cost of this revocation, resulting
in the costs (0, −v, −v). The objective of the players is to
play the strategy that minimizes their individual costs.
In addition, we introduce the notion of the social cost C
that represents the total cost induced by attackers for all
benign nodes in the system; C includes all the costs that
are not captured by the sum of individual costs. Hence,
given that their individual costs are minimized, nodes should
also minimize the social cost, if possible (i.e., as long as
minimizing the social cost does not increase the minimized
individual costs). C can be expressed by:
C = Crev + Cabuse + Cfp + Cfn (1)
Crev is the cost of revocation games and is equal to the
sum of individual costs, Cabuse expresses the effect of attack-
ers abusing the revocation system, Cfp is the cost of false
positives, caused by incorrectly detecting benign nodes as
attackers, and Cfn quantifies the cost of undetected attack-
ers (false negatives).
3.4 Preliminaries
Here, we introduce some basic game-theoretic notions we
use to solve the revocation problem. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we only give an intuition for each concept. For the
precise mathematical definitions we refer the reader to [20].
A brief tutorial on game theory can also be found in [13].
To predict the outcome of the extensive-form game G,
one can use the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium:
A strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium if none of
the players can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing
her strategy. Unfortunately, the Nash equilibrium concept
is somewhat limited when it is applied to extensive-form
games because it sometimes predicts outcomes that are not
credible for some players (i.e., these outcomes are unreach-
able because the players will not play, out of self-interest,
according to the incredible Nash equilibrium path). Hence,
we use the stronger concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The strategy profile s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a
finite extensive-form game G if it is a Nash equilibrium of
any subgame G
′
(defined by the appropriate subtree) of the
original game G. “Finite game” means that the game has a
finite number of stages.
One can check the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria
by applying the one-deviation property. This property re-
quires that there exists no single stage in the game, in which
a player i can gain by deviating from her subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategy while conforming to it in other stages.
Hence, we can state that strategy profile s is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of a finite extensive-form game G if the
one-deviation property holds.
We will check the existence of subgame-perfect equilib-
ria in the revocation game by the technique of backward
induction (also called Zermelo’s algorithm in dynamic pro-
gramming). Backward induction works by eliminating sub-
optimal actions (i.e., yielding higher costs than the other
actions in the same subtree and at the same stage of the
game tree), beginning at the leaves of the extensive-form
tree. The obtained path (sequence of actions) in the game
tree defines the backward induction solution and any strat-
egy profile that realizes this solution is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium [20].
4. ANALYSIS
In this section, we study two types of revocation games.
First, we consider a simple version where the attack-induced
cost is fixed. We show that in this model, the players tend
to delegate the revocation decision to the nodes playing in
the last stages. This behavior is very risky if the number of
players is not precisely known or if attackers can collude to
remove some players before they can vote or sacrifice them-
selves. To overcome this limitation, we extend the first game
with the assumption of increasing costs. We show that the
modified game gives incentives to the game participants to
play in the early stages of the revocation procedure.
4.1 Game with Fixed Costs
We assume first that the attacker causes a fixed cost if
not revoked and we model this in a revocation game with
fixed costs Gf . We assume that Gf is a game of perfect
information, meaning that the players know the history of
play (in practice, this history is relayed by the players, as
we show in Section 5.3). Figure 1 shows a simple example
of Gf . Let us recall that in this example we have pdN = 3
players that want to revoke an attacker. They need n = 2
votes or a self-sacrifice to succeed (in Section 4.3 we describe
how to compute n such that n ≤ pdN). Let ni = pdN − i be
the number of remaining nodes that can participate in the
revocation game after node i that plays in the ith stage of
the game. We also assume that nh is the number of votes
that have already been cast (i.e., history of voting). Hence
nr = n − nh is the number of remaining votes that is re-
quired to revoke the attacker by voting. Theorem 4.1 iden-
tifies the strategies that a player i should follow to achieve a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in Gf . The proof is provided
in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.1. For any given values of ni, nr, v, and
c, the strategy of player i that results in a subgame-perfect
equilibrium is:
si =

[c < v] ∨ [(c > 1) ∧ (ni ≥ 1)]A if ∨[(v < c < 1) ∧ (ni ≥ nr)]
V if (v < c < 1) ∧ (ni = nr − 1)
S if (c > 1) ∧ (ni = 0)
Essentially, Theorem 4.1 says that as the attacker cost
is fixed, the only objective of the players is to remove the
attacker, but they do not care in which stage. Thus, the
revocation decision is left to the last players, either by voting
or by self-sacrifice, whichever induces less cost. For example,
a node plays S only if the attack-induced cost is higher than
the cost of self-sacrifice and this node is the last player in
the game.
The solution in Theorem 4.1 is not robust to estimation
errors that are due to the high mobility in ephemeral net-
works. In fact, some of the last players may move out of
radio range, thus leaving the game before their turn to play;
hence, a revocation decision cannot be reached in this case.
To overcome this limitation, we propose a modified version
of the revocation game considering variable costs in Sec-
tion 4.2. We also consider these errors when designing our
practical revocation protocol in Section 5.1 by allowing the
players to reassess the game conditions in each stage.
4.2 Game with Variable Costs
As explained in Section 3.3, the attack-induced cost can
increase in each stage where the attacker is not revoked.
We model this situation in a revocation game with variable
costs Gv. For simplicity, let us assume that the cost at
stage j can be represented by cj = j · δ, where δ is equal
to the cost in a single stage. In our model, cj is a linearly
increasing cost, but we can derive similar results for any
increasing cost function. Figure 2 (a) shows an example of
Gv for three players. We also assume that the cost after
the final stage of the revocation game grows infinitely, i.e.,
lim
j→∞
cj = ∞ if the attacker is not revoked. In addition,
we assume that v < δ. Figure 2 (b) shows the simplified
version of this revocation game with the above assumptions.
Theorem 4.2 identifies the strategy profile that achieves a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in Gv. The proof is provided
in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. For any given values of ni, nr, v, and
δ, the strategy of player i that results in a subgame-perfect
equilibrium is:
si =

[(1 ≤ ni < min{nr − 1, 1δ })
A if ∧(v + (nr − 1)δ < 1)] ∨ [(1 ≤ ni < 1δ )∧(v + (nr − 1)δ > 1)]
V if (ni ≥ nr − 1) ∧ (v + (nr − 1)δ < 1)
S otherwise
The intuition of Theorem 4.2 is that, in contrast to the
game with fixed costs, players are more concerned about
quickly revoking the attacker because its cost increases with
time. Hence, under some conditions, they will begin the
revocation process (by voting or self-sacrifice) in the early
stages of the game.
4.3 Optimal Number of Voters
According to Theorem 4.1, if v < c < 1 and ni = nr − 1,
revocation takes place by voting in Gf . Similarly, revoca-
tion will be performed by voting in Gv when ni ≥ nr − 1
and v + (nr − 1)δ < 1. In this section we compute the
optimal number of voters nopt by minimizing a simplified
version of the social cost C (Eq. 1). We derive nopt only for
variable cost games (as mentioned in Section 4.1 and con-
firmed by simulations, Gf cannot cope with high mobility
in ephemeral networks). The simplified social cost is:
C = n+
M
n
(2)
The first term, n, is the amount of time, in stages, during
which the attacker can damage the network and it repre-
sents the cost of revocation Crev. The second term,
M
n
,
represents the cost of abuse Cabuse of the revocation scheme
by M adversaries (assuming the worst case scenario when
M adversaries can revoke at most M
n
benign nodes). We do
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Figure 2: Game model with variable costs for three users. (a) Attack-induced costs increase in each stage
j: cj = j · δ (b) Simplified version where lim
j→∞
cj =∞ and v < δ. The branches corresponding to the incredible
threats have been eliminated, considering the above assumptions.
not include Cfp and Cfn in the equation because their in-
fluence on the estimation of n is less significant; instead, we
show by simulations their effect on the social cost. Taking
into account that the number of votes should not exceed the
number of players, the optimal number of votes is:
nopt = min{pdN,
√
M} (3)
where n =
√
M is the value that minimizes C in Eq. 2.
The estimation of the parameters used in the computation
of nopt will be explained in the next section.
5. PROTOCOLS
In this section, we describe a set of protocols that imple-
ment revocation games. Section 5.1 introduces the RevoGame
protocol that selects strategies according to Theorem 4.2.
We do not show the protocol for games with fixed costs be-
cause it does not work in ephemeral networks due to high
mobility. Section 5.2 is a detailed evaluation of RevoGame
by realistic simulations; it also compares the protocol with
the voting and self-sacrifice strategies. Last but not least,
section 5.3 shows how to cryptographically aggregate the
votes of several players in an efficient way.
5.1 The RevoGame Protocol
The game-theoretic model presented in Section 4 allowed
us to determine the optimal strategies and parameters, given
some assumptions that should hold during the game. These
assumptions are necessary to gain some theoretical insight
into the problem, but they have to be carefully assessed
when we apply the theoretical results in practical settings.
For example, we derived the subgame-perfect equilibria in
Section 4 by using backward induction. One of the main
criticisms of backward induction in the game-theoretic com-
munity is that it relies on a long chain of assumptions on
other players’ actions, especially when the number of play-
ers is large. Hence, basing a strategy on the assumption that
a given number of following nodes will play their predicted
actions implicitly assumes that these nodes will be still in the
attacker’s neighborhood. But this assumption may not hold
in a highly mobile network. In addition, nodes that revoke
an attacker stop playing, even if they stay in the attacker’s
neighborhood, and hence the effective number of players de-
creases. The solution to these problems is twofold. First,
we scale down the number of detectors pdN by a factor pa
that represents the estimated fraction of active players (i.e.,
nodes that continue playing) among the detectors. Second,
the parameters used in the derivation of the optimal strategy
should be re-estimated before each action.
The protocol RevoGame integrates the game-theoretic anal-
ysis in Section 4 with the practical considerations above for
Gv. In a nutshell, RevoGame estimates the different param-
eters, defined in Section 4, and checks the play conditions
in Theorem 4.2. Based on the selected condition, RevoGame
plays the corresponding strategy.
Protocol 1 RevoGame.
Require: v < 1
1: if misbehavior detected then
2: δ ⇐ estimate(δ)
3: if δ > 1 then
4: play S
5: else
6: pd ⇐ estimate(pd)
7: pa ⇐ estimate(pa)
8: N ⇐ estimate(N)
9: M ⇐ estimate(M)
10: n⇐ min{papdN,
√
M}
11: nr ⇐ n− nh
12: ni ⇐ bpapdN − ic
13: if v + (nr − 1)δ < 1 then
14: if ni ≥ nr − 1 then
15: if nr = 1 then
16: send revocation message with vote
17: else
18: play V
19: else if 1 ≤ ni < min{nr − 1, 1δ } then
20: play A
21: else
22: play S
23: else if 1 ≤ ni < 1δ then
24: play A
25: else
26: play S
Figure 3: The simulation scenario, taken from Man-
hattan and rendered in Google Earth using TraNS.
5.2 Evaluation
To evaluate our theoretical results in a practical context,
we simulated the above protocol in an ephemeral network.
More specifically, we focused on the re-estimation of n, given
the number of attackers and detectors. To simulate the
ephemeral network, we use a city scenario with 303 vehi-
cles moving at an average speed of 50 km/h. Each vehicle
broadcasts periodic messages every 300 ms over a range of
approximately 150 m, conforming to the DSRC specifica-
tion [2] (i.e., the communication range is the distance the
vehicle can cross in 10 sec at its current speed). The sce-
nario, illustrated in Figure 3, has an area of 6.8 km × 5.5 km
in a cartesian coordinate system, is located in Manhattan,
and was generated using the VANET simulation framework
TraNS [1]; the underlying network simulator is ns-2. The re-
sults were averaged over 50 runs with 95 % confidence inter-
vals. All attackers collude against benign nodes, including
detectors, trying to revoke as many as possible before be-
ing revoked themselves (the attackers also cause damage by
disseminating false information). We chose pd = 0.8 (equiv-
alently, 80 % of benign nodes are detectors, as explained
in Section 2.3) and δ = 0.1 key/message, i.e., the cost of
one attacker is 0.1 key for each message sent in the network
(in this case, the sequence of messages represents the time
scale). Messages sent by attackers are tagged as “bad”; pd
is applied to each received message and thus represents the
fact that detection is imperfect. The cost of voting v is set
to 0.02. The sequential nature of the game is realized by
making each node backoff a random duration between 0 and
20 ms before sending its decision, thus allowing the node to
receive messages from players that have accessed the channel
earlier.
To avoid any consensus-building overhead, each node has
to estimate the parameters of the game independently. Hence,
a node sets N to be the number of its neighbors that can
hear the attacker (this can be estimated knowing the trans-
mission ranges of nodes, in turn derived from their speeds as
explained above) at the beginning of each game whereas M
is the total number of attackers it has seen so far (worst-case
scenario where all attackers collude). After doing a set of
initial simulations, we realized that a very important param-
eter to properly set is pfp, the probability of false positives of
the detection mechanism. In our implementation, pfp is the
probability of identifying a message received from a benign
node as “bad”. Relatively high values of pfp (e.g., 10
−2, i.e.,
1 % of all messages) may result in revoking many benign
nodes. Therefore, we selected a much smaller value of pfp,
namely 10−4, which can be realized by requiring nodes to re-
ceive several “bad” messages before identifying their sender
as an attacker. Last but not least, each node estimates the
fraction of active players pa by using its own history of play;
more precisely, pa is the fraction of times the node has par-
ticipated in revocation games.
When we first tried to simulate the game with fixed costs,
we realized that none of the attackers nor the benign nodes
was revoked. This can be easily explained by the fact that
in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, the revoca-
tion was left to the very last players. In ephemeral networks,
the assumption that these players will still be available to
play does not hold because nodes move out of range very
fast. This non-surprising result justifies the assumption of
continuously increasing attack-induced costs (i.e., a game
with variable costs). Figure 4 compares the performance
of the RevoGame protocol, self-sacrifice, and voting with a
fixed number of votes n = 5 (this is the value of n proposed
in [24], the only related work where we found a specific small
value for n). We can see how the game-theoretic approach
adapts to the number of detectors and attackers in the sys-
tem and thus performs better than the other two protocols.
In fact, as this scenario is of medium density, the optimal
number of votes is nopt = 1 most of the time. Although this
value may seem counterintuitive at first (it makes abuse eas-
ier), the plots actually show in detail how it surpasses the
other options. It is worth noting here that a strategic ad-
versary trying to manipulate RevoGame has little advantage
as voting with 1 vote is presumably the strategy that the
adversary can exploit best. In addition, nopt = 1 shows
that the algorithm for estimating nopt is conservative and
successfully manages to cope with varying numbers of de-
tectors and attackers.
Figure 4(a) shows the percentage of revoked attackers.
We can see that both RevoGame and self-sacrifice are effi-
cient at revoking attackers, obviously because it is easy to
revoke attackers when a revocation decision is taken by a
single node; RevoGame slightly outperforms self-sacrifice be-
cause fewer detectors sacrifice themselves in the first case.
The effect of the three protocols on the percentage of re-
voked benign nodes can be seen in Figure 4(b) where self-
sacrifice removes many more benign nodes, including detec-
tors, than RevoGame. Clearly, voting with a fixed n = 5
adapts poorly to a large number of attackers (because there
are not enough non-revoked detectors) but avoids the re-
vocation of benign nodes when the percentage of attackers
is small. To see whether this is beneficial or detrimental
to the system, we plotted the social cost of each scheme in
Figure 4(c) where we can see that self-sacrifice is costlier
than the other two schemes. Although RevoGame is costlier
than voting for small numbers of attackers, the cost of the
conservative voting scheme increases faster with the num-
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Figure 4: Performance of local revocation schemes.
ber of attackers. This is because the costs increase while
the attackers remain in the system and voting takes longer
to revoke attackers. Figure 4(d) shows the maximum delay
between the appearance of an attacker in the system and
its revocation. RevoGame performs best because it revokes
fewer benign nodes than the other two schemes (put differ-
ently, it keeps more detectors in the system); as expected,
voting is the slowest among the three.
Figures 4(e) and 4(f) show how the local revocation infor-
mation is spread in its neighborhood; it reflects the global
effect of the local mechanisms. We can see that RevoGame
manages to keep the average percentage of benign nodes
ignoring an attacker higher than that of the other two pro-
tocols because fewer benign nodes are revoked by RevoGame.
The same reason explains why a smaller percentage of be-
nign nodes ignore a benign node. Figure 4(f) actually gives
us an interesting insight into the effect of false positives and
attacker abuse of each protocol. Self-sacrifice can result in
many benign nodes being ignored by other benign nodes.
Voting is obviously the most resilient to false positives and
abuse for relatively small percentages of attackers. But as
the percentage of attackers increases, the effect of their col-
lusion increases fast, resulting in more benign nodes being
ignored. The positive aspect of RevoGame is that it keeps
the average percentage of ignored benign nodes relatively
stable.
In summary, RevoGame is as efficient, in terms of success
rate and speed, as self-sacrifice in removing attackers but
revokes fewer benign nodes, thus limiting the effect of abuse
of the revocation scheme by attackers. Voting with a fixed
number of votes is less efficient and slower than the other
two schemes. Voting is also more resilient to the abuse of
the revocation scheme when the number of attackers is rel-
atively small, but RevoGame performs better for larger per-
centages of attackers. These observations justify the need for
economic models of security problems, taking into account
metrics (e.g., attack-induced costs) that are not captured by
merely computing the number of revoked attackers and be-
nign nodes. The protocols, such as RevoGame, built on such
a model can be both efficient and adaptive to the actual
security costs of a system.
5.3 Protocols for Vote Aggregation
In the case of voting, a revocation message should include
the signed votes of all the voters that contributed to the
revocation decision in order to limit the abuse of the revo-
cation scheme by attackers. A straightforward approach to
do this is to concatenate all the votes in the revocation mes-
sage. But this would inflate both the size and the verification
time of the revocation message, which is highly undesirable
in ephemeral networks. Fortunately, savings in space, and
sometimes time, can be achieved by using a special cryp-
tographic construction - aggregate signatures - that allows
for the compression of multiple signatures into a single one.
Two possible constructions are suitable in our case: gen-
eral and sequential aggregate signatures. In the following,
we describe how these constructions can be applied to vote
aggregation and compare them.
5.3.1 General Aggregate Signatures
General aggregate signatures allow any node to aggre-
gate the signatures of other nodes in any order. For the
sake of generality, we define the three algorithms GenSign,
GenAggSign, and GenAggVerify to designate individual sig-
nature generation, aggregate signature generation and ag-
gregate signature verification, respectively. Although any
general aggregate signature scheme can be used, our scheme
of choice in this work is the BGLS signature [8] based on the
BLS short signatures [9].
Let vi be the public key of a node i, va be the public key
of the attacker being revoked, σi be the individual signature
of i, σ′i be the aggregate signature so far, n
′
i be the optimal
number of voters computed by i, ti the current timestamp of
i, votei the message (vote) of i, and vote
′
i the aggregate vote
so far. Let the field flagr = 1 designate that the revocation
decision is reached, otherwise flagr = 0. As general aggre-
gate signatures are unordered, a voter can precompute the
signature on its vote prior to the reception of the other votes.
If the revocation decision is not yet reached, the aggregate-
so-far signature on the other votes σ′i−1 can be aggregated
with σi (note here that the index i does not refer to the sign-
ing order but to the transmission order). If the revocation
decision is reached, σi has to be recomputed with flagr set
to 1. In addition to aggregating the votes, the certificates
certi of the public keys vi can be aggregated as well, us-
ing the same primitive. In this case, “certificate” specifically
means the signature of the CA over vi, hence certificates can
be aggregated with the signatures on votes. We assume that
nodes know the public key of the CA and thus are able to
verify its certificates. The protocol GenVote illustrates the
vote aggregation process.
Protocol 2 GenVote
Ensure: flagr = 0
1: votei ⇐ va‖flagr‖vi‖n′i‖ti
2: σi ⇐ GenSign(votei) // precompute the signature
3: if votes received then
4: if decision = revocation then
5: flagr ⇐ 1
6: votei ⇐ va‖flagr‖vi‖n′i‖ti
7: σi ⇐ GenSign(votei) // recompute the sig.
8: σ′i ⇐ GenAggSign(σi, certi)
9: vote′i ⇐ va‖flagr‖v1‖n′1‖t1‖ . . . ‖vi‖n′i‖ti‖σ′i
GenVoteVerify illustrates the vote verification process. This
is done only if flagr = 1, i.e., a revocation decision has been
reached. First, the votes need to be reconstructed and then
the aggregate signature is verified.
Protocol 3 GenVoteVerify(vote′k)
1: va, f lagr, σ
′
k ⇐ extract(vote′k)
Ensure: flagr = 1
2: for i = 1 to k do
3: vi, n
′
i, ti ⇐ extract(vote′k)
4: if i < k then
5: votei ⇐ va‖0‖vi‖n′i‖ti // reconstruct the votes
6: else
7: votek ⇐ va‖1‖vk‖n′k‖tk
8: GenAggVerify(vote1, . . . , votek, v1, . . . , vk, σ
′
k)
5.3.2 Sequential Aggregate Signatures
Although general aggregate signatures sometimes allow
for saving time on signature computation, they require both
the public key and the certificate of a voter to be sent
over the air. A common solution to this problem is to use
identity-based signatures (IBS) where the identity of a node
serves as its public key and its capability to sign plays the
role of the certificate in the previous scheme. The only pos-
sible, so far, aggregate constructions using IBS are sequen-
tial aggregate signatures where signatures are generated in
a given order and aggregation and signing are the same op-
eration [6]. This means that it is not possible to precom-
pute individual signatures. The advantage of identity-based
signatures is that no certificates need to be added to the
signatures. Given that it is easier to optimize the computa-
tion time, as explained in the next section, rather than the
message overhead, sequential aggregate signatures based on
IBS can be a viable option in our scenario.
We define IBSeqSign and IBSeqVerify to designate the ag-
gregate signature generation and verification algorithms. Let
IDi be the identity of node i and IDa be the identity of the
attacker. We assume that the aggregate signature construc-
tion is based on the IBSAS scheme recently proposed in [6].
The protocol IBSeqVote illustrates the vote aggregation pro-
cess. The same definitions as in the previous section apply.
Protocol 4 IBSeqVote
Ensure: flagr = 0
1: if vote′i−1 received then
2: for j = 1 to i− 1 do
3: IDj , n
′
j , tj ⇐ extract(vote′i−1)
4: if decision = revocation then
5: flagr ⇐ 1
6: votei ⇐ IDa‖flagr‖ID1‖n′1‖t1‖ . . . ‖IDi‖n′i‖ti
7: σi ⇐ IBSeqSign(votei)
8: vote′i ⇐ votei‖σi
We omit the description of IBSeqVerify as it is similar to
GenVoteVerify.
5.3.3 Comparison
A general aggregate signature can be as short as 171 bits
(for 1024-bit security) if the individual signatures are BLS
short signatures [9], but requires the certificates of the public
keys of all signers. Although certificates can be aggregated
as described in the previous section, this may not always
be possible (e.g., if certificates are not based on the BLS
short signatures). An additional drawback of the general
aggregate signatures based on the BGLS scheme is that the
verification time requires a linear, in the number of voters,
number of pairing computations [8], an expensive crypto-
graphic primitive.
The identity-based aggregate signatures are longer than
the BLS signatures but require no certificates; they still re-
quire the transmission of the identities of all the signers. An
additional advantage of the IBSAS scheme is that verifica-
tion of an aggregate signature requires three pairing compu-
tations independently of the number of signers [6].
In summary, in terms of communication overhead, general
aggregate signatures are comparable to sequential aggregate
signatures if the certificates in the first scheme are aggre-
gated; otherwise, the latter scheme generates shorter aggre-
gate signatures. In terms of computation overhead, general
aggregate signatures are faster to generate (especially with
precomputations) but slower to verify, whereas sequential
aggregate signatures are slower to generate but faster to
verify. As a last note on the efficiency of pairing compu-
tations, recent results have shown the feasibility of pairings
on resource-constrained devices such as smart cards [33]. Of
course, the platform of choice plays a crucial role in the ex-
ecution speed, but it is reasonable to expect that efficient
bilinear pairings will soon be a common and viable crypto-
graphic primitive [7].
6. CONCLUSION
New types of networks usually require new security mech-
anisms. Ephemeral networks are an example where repu-
tation systems may not perform well. In this paper, we
have studied the applicability of local revocation mecha-
nisms to handle misbehavior in these networks. Using a
game-theoretic model, we have derived the optimal strate-
gies and parameters for different combinations of detection
capability and attacker penetration and impact. In addi-
tion, we have designed a protocol, RevoGame, based on the
game-theoretic analysis and practical considerations. Re-
alistic simulation results in vehicular networks show that
the game-theoretic approach achieves the elusive tradeoff
between the approaches found in the literature.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof. We use the one-stage-deviation principle to prove
that deviating from each of the strategies in Theorem 4.1
under the corresponding conditions will not result in a gain.
Let us assume that c < v, i.e., voting is more expen-
sive than enduring the attack-induced cost. If at any stage,
player i deviates from the strategy A, playing V or S would
result in a cost of v or 1, respectively. In both cases, the
cost is bigger than c (assuming that v < 1 as mentioned in
Section 3.3). Figure 5 illustrates this case.
If v < c < 1 and ni ≥ nr, i.e., voting is less expensive
than the attack-induced cost and the number of remaining
detectors is bigger than the required number of voters, then
playing S or V would result in a cost of 1 or v, respectively.
These costs are greater than 0 (the attacker will be revoked
anyway because v < c). Hence, i cannot gain by deviating
from the action A. This is shown in Figure 6 for pdN = 3.
Another case that makes action A the best response is
when the attack-induced cost c is bigger than 1, the cost of
self-sacrifice, and the number of remaining players is bigger
than 1 (ni ≥ 1), i.e., the attacker will be revoked by another
player anyway. The proof is similar to the previous cases
and is illustrated in Figure 7.
Let us now assume that v < c < 1, ni = nr−1, and player
i that is supposed to play V according to strategy si above,
deviates in a single stage. If it plays S or A, it loses 1 or
c, respectively, both bigger than v. In both cases, i cannot
gain by deviating from V .
Finally, if c > 1 and ni = 0, if player i deviates from
S by playing A or V , the player’s cost will be c or c + v,
respectively. Both costs are greater than 1 and deviation
results in a loss.
Based on the above cases, deviation from any action under
the corresponding conditions results in a loss for the deviat-
ing player and hence strategy si leads to a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Proof. We will prove this theorem, as before, by show-
ing that the actions in the theorem are the players’ best
responses under the corresponding conditions.
If 1 ≤ ni < min{nr − 1, 1δ } (i.e., there are not enough
voters but at least another player can self-sacrifice) and
v + (nr − 1)δ < 1 (i.e., self-sacrifice is more expensive than
voting), deviating from playing A will cause player i a cost of
1, because playing S is the only possible option (the number
of voters is insufficient). Hence, i does not gain by devia-
tion. This is shown in the subtree of player 2 on the left in
Figure 8.
If 1 ≤ ni < 1δ and v + (nr − 1)δ > 1, deviating from
playing A will cause player i a cost of 1 if it plays S and a
cost of v+(nr − 1)δ if it plays V . Hence, i does not gain by
deviation from A. This is illustrated in the subtree of player
2 on the left in Figure 9.
If ni ≥ nr−1 and v+(nr−1)δ < 1, i.e., there are enough
voters and voting is less expensive than self-sacrifice, and
player i deviates from playing V by playing A or S, its cost
will be niδ or 1, respectively. In both cases the cost will be
greater than v + (nr − 1)δ, assuming v is negligible. Hence,
the player does not gain by one-stage deviation. This is
shown in Figure 8.
The expanded condition for playing S is: [δ > 1] ∨ [(ni <
nr−1)∧ ((ni = 0)∨ (ni ≥ 1δ ))∧ (v+(nr−1)δ < 1)]∨ [((ni =
0)∨(ni ≥ 1δ ))∧(δ < 1 < v+(nr−1)δ)]. If δ > 1 (the attack-
induced cost is more expensive than self-sacrifice) and player
i deviates from strategy S, it can play V or A. If it plays V ,
it loses v + (nr − 1)δ > 1 and if it plays A, it loses niδ > 1
as shown in Figure 10.
If ni = 0 (the current player is the last one) or ni ≥ 1δ
(alternately niδ ≥ 1, which means that the cost of abstaining
is higher than the cost of self-sacrifice), and v+(nr−1)δ < 1
and ni < nr−1 (i.e., voting is cheaper than self-sacrifice but
there are not enough voters), deviating from S by playing A
would result in a cost of niδ if ni ≥ 1δ or ∞ if ni = 0 (the
attacker will not be revoked). Playing V would not lead to
revocation (as there are not enough voters) and hence result
in a cost of v+niδ if ni ≥ 1δ or∞ if ni = 0. Hence, deviation
from S would not pay off. This is shown in the subtree of
player 3 in Figure 8. A similar proof can be made if ni = 0
or ni ≥ 1δ , and δ < 1 < v + (nr − 1)δ: both voting and
abstaining are more expensive than self-sacrifice and hence
deviation from S would increase the cost (in other words,
lower the payoff). This can be seen in the subtree of player
3 in Figure 9. Based on the above, one-stage-deviation from
the strategy si degrades the deviating player’s payoff and
hence si leads to a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Extensive form of Gf when c < v. Action
A for all players is the best response. The thick lines
show the best response of each player in every stage
of the game. This can be obtained by comparing the
resulting costs for all strategies of a player moving in
a given stage. The continuous thick line represents
the subgame-perfect equilibrium (all nodes play A).
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Figure 6: Extensive form of Gf when v < c < 1.
Action A for the first player is the best response
since ni ≥ nr, whereas the best response for nodes 2
and 3 is V since ni < nr. Hence, the subgame-perfect
equilibrium game is achieved if player 1 plays A, 2
plays V , and 3 plays V .
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Figure 7: Extensive form of Gf when c > 1. Action
A is the best response of the first and second play-
ers because n1 > n2 ≥ 1, whereas player 3 plays S
because n3 = 0.
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Figure 8: Extensive form of Gv when v+(nr−1)δ < 1.
The subgame perfect equilibrium is achieved when
players 1 and 2 play V .
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Figure 9: Extensive form of Gv when v + (nr − 1)δ >
1 > δ. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is achieved
when player 1 plays S.
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Figure 10: Extensive form of Gv when δ > 1.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium is achieved when
player 1 plays S.
